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1
Economic activity in the Soviet Union is based
upon an economic plan decreed by the Govern-
ment. This plan prescribes in detail the conditions
under which the State administration and the in-
dustrial, agricultural, and commercial enterprises
may use their resources in producing and distribut-
ing goods and services. Since the production and
distribution processes involve the use of money
and credit, the plan contains many elements of
monetary and credit policy. It therefore provides
for financial institutions that control the supply
of money and credit and the purposes for which
it may be used. Among these institutions are sev-
eral State-owned banks, the most important of
which is the State Bank of the U.S.S.R.
Although the economic plan is formulated by
centralized procedures, its execution necessitates
a certain degree of decentralization of responsi-
bility among administrative agencies, enterprises,
and individuals. The State administration has its
own budget, with income derived mainly from
taxation and to a lesser extent from borrowing
from finanical institutions and individuals. The
enterprises, although wholly controlled and mostly
owned by the State, have their own assets and
liabilities and earn profits or suffer losses.
Individuals receive money income, mainly in
the form of wages and salaries from the State or
from State-owned enterprises. This money income
may be used not only for personal expenditures,
but also in some degree for the accumulation of
savings, for instance in the form of savings accounts.
The State administration and the enterprises carry
out their financial transactions primarily through
transfers from and to their bank accounts; indi-
viduals use almost exclusively cash, mainly in the
form of bank notes. There is no market for loans
to individuals or enterprises, and no sale of secu-
rities other than Government bonds. Likewise,
except for limited sales of private homes, there are
no sales of real estate. Thus investment financing
is conducted exclusively through the banking system
and not through security, commodity, or real
1 This article was prepared by Edward Ames under the
supervision of }. H. Furth, Chief of the Central and Eastern
European Section of the Board's Division of International
Finance.
estate markets.
The Soviet planning mechanism relies in part on
the desire of managers and workers to increase
their income and consumption, and therefore does
not completely disregard the reactions of individ-
uals to changes in their incomes and in prices. It
does not subject itself to the test of a market, how-
ever, and does not attempt to set prices and pro-
duction at the levels which would result if a free
market mechanism were functioning. In short, it
does not measure the success of its program or the
efficiency of the economy in general by reference
to the operations of a market mechanism.
The Soviet banks maintain their own offices and
engage in banking activities similar to those of
noncommunist countries, such as issuing notes,
receiving deposits, and making loans at interest.
They have their own assets and liabilities and aim
at making a profit, part of which they retain in
their capital accounts. However, they differ from
central and commercial banks in noncommunist
countries in that their activities are dictated by the
economic plan. The banks have only limited power
to determine their own policies and operations.
The use of statistical information on financial
and monetary developments in the U.S.S.R. pre-
sents great difficulties. In the first place, statistics
are fragmentary; they are published irregularly and
presented in a propaganda context which often
raises doubts about their reliability.
Secondly, the data themselves, when available,
must be analyzed with considerable caution because
statistics in a completely planned economy have a
meaning different from that of statistics in a free
market economy: prices, incomes, and outlays may
be changed by administrative decisions independent
of changes in the actual conditions of production,
distribution, or demand. The subjection of prices
and wages to the planning mechanism, espe-
cially the practice of isolating prices and wages in
one sector of the economy from those in other
sectors, makes it particularly difficult to use price
and wage data, or data involving price and wage
figures, such as budget expenditures, for interpret-
ing economic developments.
Finally, the conversion of Soviet financial data
into dollars is complicated by the fact that the ruble
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does not enter into international transactions and
has no market value. Its nominal value was 18.8
cents until March 1, 1950, and has been 25 cents
since then. M. Wyczalkowski of the International
Monetary Fund estimated the 1950 purchasing
power of the ruble to be about 4 cents in retail
transactions and 10 cents in wholesale transactions,
the difference being due to sales taxes.
2
SOVIET FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Soviet capital formation—including investment
in plant, equipment, and inventories—is mainly
financed through the Ministry of Finance, a Cabi-
net agency, which includes the following operating
agencies:
1) The tax collection and disbursement agencies,
that is, the apparatus common to ministries of
finance in general.
2) The State Bank, which is an autonomous
unit "within the system of the Ministry of Finance."
All transactions other than wage payments, retail
sales, and construction transactions represent trans-
fers from one State Bank deposit to another, while
wage payments and retail sales, respectively, are
the principal channels for the inflow and outflow
of bank notes.
3) Four "Banks for Long-term Investments,"
the Industrial Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the
Bank of Trade, and the Central Communal Bank.
The last is a sort of holding company, controlling
a number of local banks. Each bank disburses
budgetary appropriations for construction in its re-
spective field, and each makes loans to cooperatives
and to State enterprises under the jurisdiction of
local authorities.
4) A system of savings institutions which receive
deposits from individuals and invest the proceeds
in State bonds.
5) A system of insurance covering damage to
State property, and issuing life and personal prop-
erty insurance policies to individuals.
An investment transaction arises typically from
a contract between two enterprises, with the pur-
chasing enterprise paying the builder or supplier
partly from its own funds but mainly with funds
made available by one of the investment banks
either from budget appropriations or from the
bank's own resources.
2 International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, September
1950.
The savings and insurance institutions are un-
important and subordinate to the fiscal system.
The over-all economic plan affects financial in-
stitutions as well as the State enterprises through
the directives included in the following component
plans:
1) A plan for production, costs, and employ-
ment and wages, prepared by the ministries on the
basis of directives issued by the State Planning
Committee, a Cabinet agency.
2) A plan for capital investment prepared by the
ministries on the basis of directives issued by the
State Committee on Construction, a Cabinet agency.
3) A State Budget prepared by the Ministry of
Finance.
4) A credit plan prepared by the State Bank that
establishes a credit ceiling for each industry in order
to provide effective "control by the ruble" over its
operations.
5) A "cash plan" prepared by the State Bank to
establish note circulation on the basis of ceilings
for wage payments in the various industries and
of the value of retail transactions.
The directives contain detailed instructions to
each Ministry, to each regional office of the Ministry
of Finance and the State Bank, and to each pro-
ducing unit. The budget is ordinarily submitted
to the Supreme Soviet (the legislature), which
ratifies it unanimously after suggesting minor
changes to the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet).
The other plans are approved by the Council.
The budget is published in general outline, but the
other plans are ordinarily not made public.
In any given year the actual amounts produced,
the actual revenues and outlays of the budget, and
other indices included in the economic plan differ
from planned amounts. These deviations result
in part from changes in the Government program
during the course of the year and in part from per-
formance better or worse than planned by the
various Soviet agencies. Information as to these
deviations is as fragmentary as information con-
cerning the plans; it is therefore often impossible
to determine whether the plans give a correct pic-
ture of events.
FINANCIAL CONTROLS
The Soviet authorities have established an elabo-
rate system of direct as well as monetary controls
in order to make sure that the funds of economic
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enterprises, as well as those of the banking system,
are used only for the purposes of the plan.
Construction control. Controls over construction
are designed to prevent investment funds (most of
which are from budget appropriations) from being
used to finance current production and to make
sure that Government-approved projects, and only
those projects, are actually carried out.
Construction projects requiring more than a
small amount of expenditure must be approved by
a Cabinet committee; smaller projects may be ap-
proved by the Ministry having jurisdiction over the
industry where the plant is being built. The ap-
proval is given only after the presentation of three
sets of documents: an economic justification of the
project; a set of blue-prints and specifications; and
an estimate of the cost of the project, broken down
on a quarterly basis. When approval has been
given, a special account is set up in the appropriate
investment bank (usually the Industrial Bank).
For the most part the funds deposited are appro-
priated from the State Budget, and may be drawn
upon only within limits established in the cost
estimate and for purposes described in the engi-
neering specifications.
Construction is carried on by special construc-
tion enterprises, which make contracts with the
producers who will operate the completed plants.
In most cases, the construction enterprise is not
connected in any way with the producing enter-
prise, but in some cases the producing enterprise
sets up a special construction division. Payments
to the construction agency may be made only on
the basis of work actually performed, in amounts
limited by the terms of the contract, and from
funds actually on deposit in the investment bank
that is supervising the construction.
The investment banks are operated as integral
parts of the Ministry of Finance. Their main
function is the supervision of the expenditure of
funds from their accounts. They also receive the
deposits of construction enterprises and of enter-
prises undertaking construction projects. Their
power to finance investments on their own is lim-
ited. They are permitted to make loans only to
cooperatives, very small State-owned enterprises
operated by local authorities, and individuals bor-
rowing to finance housing construction. The
total amount an investment bank can lend to such
borrowers in any period is determined by its profits,
by repayments of principal on earlier loans, and
by budget appropriations supplementing its capital.
Soviet comments on long-term lending indicate
fairly steady upward pressure on loan ceilings from
potential borrowers. There is also some tendency
for enterprises to use funds designated for construc-
tion purposes to finance inventories, according to
the complaints made by the Minister of Finance
in his budget reports. In particular, enterprises
often fail to transfer profits and depreciation funds
to the investment banks in the amounts stipulated
by the plan.
Current production control. Controls over cur-
rent production are analogous in purpose to those
over capital construction: to prevent the producing
enterprises from using funds designated for current
production to finance construction, or to finance
current production other than that envisaged by
the economic plan. The State Bank is the chief
instrumentality in the exercise of this set of con-
trols; it attempts to minimize the liquidity of the
enterprises by means of the following regulations:
1) Enterprises are required to keep their liquid
funds in interest-bearing deposits in the State Bank.
2) Enterprises are forbidden to receive credit
from or extend credit to other enterprises, and nor-
mally cannot purchase interest-bearing securities.
3) A depreciation fund is set up in the name of
each economic ministry and a depreciation al-
lowance, based on the original cost of the fixed
capital of enterprises controlled by the ministry,
must be transferred periodically to it.
4) Payments of profits taxes must be made
monthly, subject to adjustments at the end of the
year, and other tax payments must be made still
more frequently, so as to prevent the enterprises
from accumulating liquid funds by building up
liabilities to the Ministry of Finance. Profits allo-
cated to finance construction must be regularly
transferred to special deposits in the investment
banks.
5) The planned size and composition of the cur-
rent assets of each enterprise are determined by the
volume of production planned for the enterprise,
the permissible level of inventories being fixed at
a certain number of days' requirements. Since the
amount of current assets allowed an enterprise
usually exceeds its own financial resources, it must
have recourse to bank credit if it is to maintain
its planned level of production.
6) If the current assets of an enterprise are con-
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sidered to be excessive, the enterprise may be re-
quired to transfer the excess to the Ministry of
Finance.
The State Bank is permitted to grant credit to an
enterprise only on the basis of individual transac-
tions, and to finance only stipulated percentages of
any transaction. This requirement is intended to
prevent the enterprise from concentrating borrowed
funds in certain activities and using its own funds
for other activities.
An enterprise is obligated to complete the pro-
duction planned for it. If it tries to expand plant
facilities or inventories in order to insure smoother
operations, it will require additional amounts from
the State Bank. Likewise, if an enterprise has
been operating at a loss, or at a level of profit
insufficient to meet its tax obligations, it will re-
quire additional funds from the Bank. Before grant-
ing a credit, the Bank must determine whether
the need for credit results from an improper diver-
sion of resources from current output to unau-
thorized construction. Likewise, the Bank must
decide whether the demand for credit results from
accumulation of unsold finished goods (which
would indicate that the quality of the goods was too
low or that the sales department of the enterprise
was inefficient) or from accumulation of goods in
process (which would indicate that the production
department of the enterprise was unable to main-
tain an even flow of materials through the plant).
The Bank is supposed to insist on the correction of
such faults as a prerequisite for the credit.
Liquidity is kept to a minimum in order that
State Bank control over the activities of enterprises
may be as effective as possible. According to avail-
able data for a few enterprises, shown in the accom-
panying table, liquid assets amounted in 1948 to
14-20 per cent of all current assets. The larger
portion of current assets consists of inventories.
For United States manufacturing corporations
at the end of 1948 liquid assets were about 38 per
cent of current assets, excluding receivables. In con-
trast, the importance of credit in financing current
assets in the U.S.S.R. is similar to that in the United
States although the types of credit are different.
About 40 per cent of all current assets of Soviet
enterprises was financed by credit in 1947, and
credit has become somewhat more important since
that time. In the United States, current liabilities
of manufacturing corporations were 37 per cent of
current assets at the end of 1947. In contrast
with corporations in the United States, how-
ever, Soviet enterprises have few short-term liabili-
ties to others than banks. Moreover, with the ex-
ception of small enterprises that are permitted to
finance construction with loans, Soviet enterprises
have no long-term liabilities since their outlays on
capital construction and permanent working capi-
tal are mainly obtained from the State budget or
from retained profits.
In the absence of complete data, it is not possible
to determine the extent to which the State Bank's
control over current production is successful. The
low liquidity of enterprises means, according to
Soviet commentators, that difficulties experienced
by a single enterprise rapidly lead to delays in pay-
ments and thus to similar difficulties in other enter-
prises. Since a State-owned enterprise is not per-
mitted to declare itself insolvent or to suspend
CURRENT ASSETS OF SELECTED PLANTS IN VARIOUS
SOVIET INDUSTRIES, 1948











































1 Includes a negligible amount of Bank advances on goods in
shipment, the only type of accounts receivable permitted by law.
Sources.—S. B. Barngolts and I. E. Khavin, Putt uskoreniya
oborachivaemosti oborotnykh sredstv v mashinostroenii (Methods of
Increasing the Speed of Turnover of Working Capital in the Ma-
chinery Industry), Moscow, 1950, p. 27; K. A. Fedoseev, Oborotnye
sredstva promyshlennykh predpriyafii (The Working Capital of
Industrial Enterprises), Moscow, 1949, p. 20.
operations, the Bank must extend additional credit
to a financially distressed enterprise if normal
operations are to be continued. The Minister of
Finance has repeatedly criticized the tendency of
enterprises to consider the Bank to be a residual
lender in case of emergency. Nevertheless, the
practice appears to persist although it causes some
credit to be tied up in inefficient rather than effi-
cient enterprises.
Fragmentary data concerning the balance sheets
of Leningrad enterprises on October 1, 1950 give
some indication of the problems involved in the
State Bank's supervision of the current assets of
enterprises. As shown in the following table,
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DEVIATIONS FROM PLAN OF CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
OF LENINGRAD ENTERPRISES, OCTOBER 1, 1950
















































Source.—O. Kadinski, "Ustranit prichiny vnutrimesyachnykh
platezhnykh zatrudnenii khozorganov (Removal of the Reasons
for Temporary Payments Difficulties of Business Organizations),"
Dengi i Kredit {Money and Credit, monthly organ of the State Bank
of the U. S. S. R.), No. 2, 1951.
total deviations of current balance-sheet items from
planned amounts (upward deviations of assets plus
downward deviations of liabilities) were equal to
26.8 per cent of the total current assets of the
supervised enterprises. Aggregate net deviations
were smaller since, for instance, above-plan inven-
tories in some enterprises and in some types of in-
ventories were offset by below-plan inventories in
others. It would appear that aggregate current
assets and current liabilities were about 5 per cent
below plan, with capital accounts slightly above
plan. Since the Leningrad office of the State Bank
and Leningrad industries are generally reputed to
be above the Soviet average in efficiency, these data
probably represent better than average performance.
Controls over operations of State Bank. Relations
between the State Bank, the Cabinet, and the Min-
istry of Finance have varied from time to time.
Prior to 1936 the State Bank was a part of the
Ministry. According to the 1936 constitution, the
State Bank, although a part of the Ministry of
Finance, was represented at Cabinet meetings; in
1938 it was removed from the Ministry and in
effect made a special agency responsible directly
to the Cabinet. In 1947 the State Bank was again
made part of the Ministry of Finance and deprived
of representation at the Cabinet level. #
At the present time, the Chairman of the Board
of the State Bank is an Assistant Minister of
Finance and appears to outrank slightly—as "Dep-
uty" to the Minister—the Assistant Ministers who
head the fiscal system and the other financial in-
stitutions. The operations of the State Bank have
been and continue to be independent of the opera-
tions of the fiscal agencies dealing with tax collec-
tion and disbursement.
It is not possible to state with any certainty the
reason for the separation of the State Bank from
the Ministry of Finance in 1938 or for its return
in 1947. There is no indication that major changes
in economic policy or internal political balances of
power were involved. The change appears to have
been occasioned by the need to coordinate and unify
the activities of the economic agencies dealing with
budget and credit matters and by the belief that
differences in budget and credit policies should be
resolved within a Ministry of Finance responsible
for both rather than at the Cabinet level.
STATE BANK POLICY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
State Bank control over enterprises aims not only
at making them complete their output schedules
but also at maintaining monetary stability in the
economy as a whole. The State Bank is the bank of
issue as well as the only important source of short-
term credit; it is the only organization receiving
demand deposits; and it receives and disburses all
budgetary funds. Its operations thus involve all
important components of the country's money sup-
ply, and its balance sheet reflects financial develop-
ments and changes in financial policy.
The composition of the Bank's liabilities changes
in response to fiscal, wage, and price policies. Fis-
cal operations change the relative importance of
Treasury funds to the total money supply, while
price and wage controls change the relative impor-
tance of the note issue as compared to the deposits
of the Treasury and enterprises.
The size of the money supply, however, is also
influenced by the volume of Bank assets. For
this reason an analysis of the assets and liabili-
ties of the State Bank is necessary to an under-
standing of Soviet monetary policy and its relation
to other financial developments. No balance sheet
has been published since 1936, but some informa-
tion is available concerning changes in some of its
main items.
State Bank assets. The Bank's assets consist of
gold and foreign exchange, Government debt (if
any), short-term advances with a maturity of a
few days on shipping documents in the process of
clearing, and loans to enterprises with maturities
not exceeding 12 months.
Of these items, the gold stock and foreign ex-
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change are primarily influenced by domestic gold
production and by changes in the current balance
of trade, neither of which is subject to direct con-
trol by the State Bank. Government debt to the
Bank may have been completely liquidated during
the currency conversion of 1947; in any case avail-
able data indicate a cash surplus in the Govern-
ment budget since 1943. The volume of short-term
advances is determined mainly by clearing payments
among enterprises and, although the Bank devotes
a considerable amount of attention to speeding up
the clearing process, it does not appear to use these
short-term advances as an instrument of monetary
policy.
State Bank control of the total volume of its
assets is exercised mainly by control of loans to
enterprises. Control of these loans means not only
control of inventories, which are to a considerable
degree financed by loans, but also control of the
liquidity of enterprises, as reflected in their de-
posits with the Bank. There are, however, im-
portant limitations to Bank control over loans.
Since inventories normally increase as output in-
creases, the volume of loans could be stabilized
under conditions of increasing output only if addi-
tions to inventories were financed exclusively from
increases in the financial resources of enterprises
themselves. Such a method of financing would,
however, tend to reduce the dependence of the
enterprises upon Bank loans, and would therefore
reduce Bank control. The Bank must therefore rely
in part upon fiscal policy, especially the tax on the
profits of enterprises, to retard the building up of
the enterprises' own resources.
Data on changes in the amount of loans out-
standing are not available but data concerning
planned increases in enterprises' own resources
offer indirect information about credit policy.
Financial planning by the Government called for
a growth of 14.1 billion rubles in these funds dur-
ing 1946. In subsequent years the amount rose to
a peak of 23.6 billion in 1949, declining thereafter
to 11.3 billion in 1951 and 10.7 billion in 1952.
These figures indicate neither the actual increases
in the resources of enterprises nor the planned in-
creases in Bank loans.
Complete analysis of the expansion of State Bank
loans in this period would have to take into account
a bookkeeping increase in Bank loans outstand-
ing in 1949 in connection with an inventory re-
valuation. The authorities, instead of permitting
enterprises to increase their own funds as a result
of capital gains on inventories, ordered them to
offset the increase in the book value of inventories
by writing up their indebtedness to the Bank. Ac-
cording to fragmentary data for a number of indus-
tries, however, the ratio of State Bank loans for
financing current production to funds owned by the
enterprises was fairly stable throughout the period.
If this stability was planned, it would seem that
it reflected larger planned expansions of loans until
1949 and smaller planned expansions thereafter. It
is not possible to determine the extent to which the
expansion of bank loans has actually been retarded
since 1949.
State Bank liabilities. Bank liabilities consist pri-
marily of notes, deposits of enterprises, and de-
posits of the Ministry of Finance. These con-
stitute the entire money supply of the country with
the exception of coin and Treasury notes of small
denomination. The Bank's control over the com-
position of its liabilities is limited to its ability to
prevent cash withdrawals or transfer of funds from
one deposit to another if the transactions covered
are not at prices or in amounts specified by the
planning authorities. In particular, the Bank may
prevent enterprises from making larger wage pay-
ments than are called for in the plan. This control,
according to Soviet sources, is one of the most
important of the Bank's functions, since it serves
to hold down personal incomes and hence the
outflow of notes from the Bank.
Since the Soviet economy does not operate on
the basis of a market-price mechanism, an un-
planned increase in money incomes usually tends
to increase the cash holdings of individuals. Like-
wise, an unplanned increase in bank credit usually
tends to increase the liquidity of enterprises. Prices
and production in socialized enterprises do not re-
act to changes in purchasing power because of the
inflexibility of production plans and prices that are
determined by administrative procedures. Instead,
scarcities and bottlenecks interfere with the achieve-
ment of the plan. The authorities must then either
t-aise retail prices as a means of increasing the in-
flow of notes to the State Bank, or intensify direct
controls, such as allocations of materials, rationing,
and stricter regulation of individuals. The Soviet
authorities therefore endeavor to achieve "control
by the ruble," which aims at the avoidance of excess
liquidity, primarily by restricting growth in note
circulation and in the deposits of enterprises.
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The purpose of this monetary measure is not
to replace direct controls, which are a permanent
part of the Soviet system, but to limit their sphere
and at the same time to make them more effective.
The conditions necessary for the application of
monetary controls were created, according to the
Soviet authorities, by the currency conversion of
December 1947, in which old notes were ex-
changed for new at a ratio of ten to one, and by
scaling down the values of savings deposits and
individually held State bonds. Simultaneously,
rationing was abolished.
Control of the note circulation is attempted
through the "cash plan" prepared by the State Bank.
This plan is designed to equate the outflow of
cash from the Bank in wages, social services, and
Government administrative salaries with the inflow
of cash from retail trade, tax payments, and sub-
scriptions to State bonds. State Bank policy has
been supplemented by a wage policy that provides
for the automatic reduction of piece-rates, and by
the use of price reductions rather than wage in-
creases to bring about such recovery in the stand-
ard of living from low wartime levels as was con-
sistent with over-all Soviet policy. Increases in
aggregate individual income appear to have been
little greater than increases in nonfarm employ-
ment. Disposable personal income has risen less
rapidly than aggregate income as a result of in-
creases in direct taxes and State borrowing from
individuals.
Increased spending by individuals leads to an
increased inflow of notes to the State Bank as retail
stores deposit their sales receipts. No direct in-
formation is available on retail trade in recent
years but some indication of its course can be
gathered from data on revenue from the "turn-
over" tax, a sales tax that in 1940 accounted for
more than 60 per cent of all retail outlays by con-
sumers. This revenue has been virtually stable
since 1947, varying only between limits of 230 and
240 billion rubles a year. There have been sev-
eral reductions in the prices of retail goods since
1947, and there is evidence that they have been
largely due to reductions in turnover tax rates.
The stability of turnover tax revenues despite lower
rates indicates a rise in the total value of retail
sales, and hence in the inflow of currency into the
Bank. This inflow has tended to offset the in-
creased outflow due to rising wage payments, and
thus to stabilize at least in part the volume of cur-
rency held by individuals.
The budget accounts (deposits of the Ministry
of Finance) change according to the Government
surplus or deficit (actual receipts, including bor-
rowing from the public, minus actual outlays).
The surplus rose from 3.4 billion rubles in 1945
to a peak of 39.6 billion in 1948, and then declined
to a low of 9.4 billion in 1950. For 1951 it was
planned at 6.4 billion but actually reached 28 bil-
lion, and for 1952 it is planned at 33 billion.
The rise of the surplus indicates the extent to
which the liquid funds of enterprises and indi-
viduals are being diverted into the Treasury. Re-
duction of the liquid assets of enterprises and indi-
viduals lowers their ability to purchase capital and
consumer goods, and hence reduces the problem
of bottlenecks and scarcities. The coordination of
the surplus with Bank loan policy is an important
aspect of the planning policy. Unless the Treasury
surplus rises as rapidly as Bank loans rise, an in-
crease in loans will ordinarily lead to the creation of
excess liquidity.
During the decline in the surplus from 1948 to
1950, Bank policy took two main forms. First,
it tried to reduce the rate of credit expansion by
compelling enterprises to raise the ratio of current
production to inventories. In 1950 output rose 5
per cent faster than inventories, and in the following
year 4 per cent faster. Since inventories are largely
financed by Bank loans, this policy tended to hold
down the volume of loans. Second, the Bank
exercised closer supervision over wage payments so
as to limit increases in the note issue.
Since 1951 there have been indications of in-
creased efforts to limit the expansion of note cir-
culation and deposits of enterprises. These efforts
have involved, in addition to the continuation of the
restrictions on wage payments and inventory
growth, the increase in the budget surplus men-
tioned above and a slowing down of price reduc-
tions.
If retail prices are reduced, with no change in
supplies of consumer goods, the flow of cash into
the Bank from the receipts of retail stores will also
drop. Since such a reduction does not affect per-
sonal money incomes (or the outflow of cash) its
main effect is to increase the volume of notes out-
standing. The larger the price reduction, the larger
must be the increase in the physical volume of con-
sumer goods production if the inflow of notes to
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the Bank is to be maintained at any desired level.
Reductions in retail prices were announced an-
nually on March 1 during the period 1948-51, and
on April 1, 1952. They took the form of specified
reductions—usually 10 to 20 per cent—in the prices
of particular commodities. No index of retail
prices is published, and the importance of the cuts
must be judged on the basis of the number and
types of goods covered in the reductions. During
1948-51 both foodstuffs and industrial goods were
included in the reductions. In 1951 the number of
goods covered in the reduction was much smaller
than in 1950, and in 1952 no industrial goods
prices were reduced. The small price reductions
in 1951 and 1952 make it possible for the Soviet
authorities to maintain the inflow of notes with
relatively small increases in the physical volume
of consumer goods production.
These efforts by the fiscal and monetary au-
thorities to hold down increases in purchasing
power of individuals and enterprises, or to absorb
earlier unplanned increases, are readily explained by
the impact of the Soviet investment and arma-
ment program, which increases the incomes of
both enterprises and individuals without increas-
ing correspondingly the physical volume of goods
available to consumers. The fragmentary char-
acter of the data available, however, does not
permit a quantitative evaluation of these changes
in policy, or an answer to the question whether the
measures so far taken will be sufficient to assure
reasonable monetary stability.
SUMMARY
The economic planning mechanism of the Soviet
Union imposes a wide variety of controls over
production and distribution, many of which are
administered by the banking system. The State
Bank and the fiscal authorities are separate entities,
but their operations are closely integrated by the
economic plan. The State Bank regulates the vol-
ume of money and credit, and by limiting the
liquidity of individuals and producers directs their
activities into channels contemplated by the eco-
nomic plan. The Bank's principal instrument is its
control over loans, with which it influences the
total supply of money. Under the impact of a
growing armaments and investment program,
monetary and fiscal measures appear to have be-
come more stringent.
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